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This article examines the contribution to transnational constitution-making of 
the European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as the 
Venice Commission. While part of the Council of Europe, the Venice Commission 
is much less understood than the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
notwithstanding the existing literature.1 This chapter therefore seeks to explicate 
and evaluate. It begins by explicating the organizational foundations of the Venice 
Commission, followed by analysis of its remit and role. The focus then shifts to 
triggering and working methodology. 
The remainder of the article is concerned with evaluation of the Commission’s 
role in relation to constitution-making as broadly conceived, the analysis being 
situated within the literature concerning transnational legal orders (TLOs).2 There 
is an overview of the central elements of TLO theory, the reasons why the Venice 
Commission can be conceptualized within this theoretical frame, and its distinctive 
contribution to constitution-making. TLOs are increasingly prevalent across diverse 
fields, including those concerned with constitutions, democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law. The prevalence of TLOs renders it all the more important that they 
are subject to the same searching evaluation that we commonly bring to bear when 
analyzing national norms. To this end there is more detailed analysis of the process 
rights and procedure afforded to the state that is the subject of a Venice 
Commission opinion, and the substantive criteria and standards that the 
Commission considers when producing its opinions. The article concludes with 
discussion of implementation by the addressee of the opinion, and the broader 
impact of the Commission through sharing best practice and cooperation. 
1. See, e.g., Gianni Buquicchio & Pierre Garrone, L’harmonisation du droit constitutionnel européen: La 
contribution de la Commission européenne pour la démocratie par le droit, 3 UNIFORM L. REV./ REVUE DE DROIT
UNIFORME 323 (1998); Sergio Bartole, Final Remarks: The Role of the Venice Commission, 26 REV. OF CENT.
& E. EUR. L. 351 (2000); Giorgio Malinverni, La réconciliation à travers l’assistance constitutionnelle aux pays 
de l’Europe de l’est: le rôle de la Commission de Venise, 10 LES CAHIERS DE LA PAIX 207 (2004); Gianni 
Buquicchio & Schnutz Dürr, The Venice Commission’s Action in Africa, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ERGUN 
OZBUDUN 165 (S. Yazici, et al. eds., 2008); Gianni Buquicchio, Vingt ans avec Antonio La Pergola pour 
le développement de la démocratie, in LIBER AMICORUM ANTONIO LA PERGOLA 29 (Pieter van Dijk 
& Simona Granata-Menghini eds., 2009); Gianni Buquicchio & Simona Granata-Menghini, The Venice 
Commission Twenty Years on: Challenges Met but Challenges Ahead, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND 
PRINCIPLES 241 (Marjolein van Roosmalen et al. eds., 2013); Maartje de Visser, A Critical Assessment of 
the Role of the Venice Commission in the Processes of Domestic Constitutional Reform, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 963 
(2015); Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, The Venice Commission of the Europen Council – Standards and Impact, 25 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 579 (2014); Sergio Bartole, International Constitutionalism and Conditionality: The Experience 
of the Venice Commission, 4/2014 RIVISTA (2014). 
2. See generally, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 
2015).
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FOUNDATIONS AND ORGANIZATION
The impetus for the creation of the Venice Commission came from Antonio 
La Pergola, Italy’s minister for European affairs, who, in the late 1980s, raised the 
possibility of a body that would monitor respect for democracy and the rule of law.3
The communist regime in Poland fell in 1989, followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in November 1989, and the ousting of communist governments in Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Bulgaria and Albania in the ensuing two years. La Pergola organized a 
conference in Venice in January 1990 in which members of the Council of Europe 
participated, complemented by observers from some central and east European 
countries.4 It was the catalyst for the creation of the Venice Commission,5 although 
the original agreement was for two years.6 Membership was initially confined to 
states that were party to the Council of Europe.7
The current statute dates from 2002, and it enables states that were not parties 
to the Council of Europe to become members of the Venice Commission,8 which 
now has sixty-one member states, comprising the forty-seven Council of Europe 
member states, plus fourteen other countries.9 The Venice Commission is funded 
from a budget to which the participating states contribute, which has to be agreed 
by the Committee of Ministers.10 The Venice Commission has a permanent 
secretariat, which provides the Commission with assistance;11 it is located in 
Strasbourg at the headquarters of the Council of Europe. Plenary sessions are held 
in Venice four times a year, with the secretariat preparing the agenda and supporting 
materials,12 which are normally distributed two weeks before the plenary.13 The 
Commission of the European Union participates in the plenary sessions of the 
Venice Commission. So too do the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
3. Jeffrey Jowell, The Venice Commission: Disseminating Democracy through Law, Winter 2001 PUB. L. 
675, 675 (2001). 
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers established the Venice Commission with 
Res. 90(6) adopted May 10, 1990, which contained the original statute of the Venice Commission. See
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, RES. (90)6 (1990), http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_01 
_Statute_old. 
7. See de Visser, supra note 1, at 969–70. 
8. Council of Europe, Revised Statute of the European Commission for Democracy through 
Law, Feb. 21, 2002, Res. (2002) 3 [hereinafter Revised Statute], http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages 
/?p=01_01_Statute.
9. Algeria, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Kosovo, 
Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Mexico, Peru, Tunisia and the USA. It is for the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe to invite a non-member state to join the Venice Commission. Revised Statute, supra 
note 8, at art. 2.5. 
10. Revised Statute, supra note 8, at art. 6.1. 
11. See Revised Statute, supra note 8, at art. 8; Venice Commission, Revised Rules of Procedure, 
CDL-AD(2015)044, at art. 7. 
12. Revised Rules of Procedure, supra note 11, at art. 8.1. 
13. Revised Rules of Procedure, supra note 11, at art. 9.1. 
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Europe (OSCE)14 and the OSCE office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR),15 which also participate in sub-commissions of the Venice 
Commission.
The Venice Commission elects a bureau, renewable for two years, composed 
of the president, three vice-presidents, and four other members.16 The president 
presides over the Commission’s work and represents the Commission.17 There are 
sub-commissions dealing with fundamental rights; federal states and regional states; 
international law; protection of minorities; the judiciary; democratic institutions; 
working methods; Latin America; the Mediterranean Basin; the rule of law; and 
gender equality. Opinions and reports are discussed by the relevant sub-commission 
before consideration by the plenary.18 In addition, there is a joint Council on 
Constitutional Justice, as well as a Council on Democratic Elections, which are 
discussed below. There is also a Scientific Council, composed of the President and 
Vice-Presidents of the Commission; the Chairs of the sub-commissions; and 
members who direct research centers on constitutional, international or human 
rights law. The Scientific Council prepares restatements of Commission doctrine in 
specific areas; takes stock of implementation of Commission opinions and reports; 
proposes the studies that should be undertaken; and provides rapporteurs with 
material for the preparation of opinions and reports.19
Membership of the Venice Commission is regulated by Article 2 of the Statute. 
It stipulates that the Commission shall be composed of “independent experts who 
have achieved eminence through their experience in democratic institutions or by 
their contribution to the enhancement of law and political science.”20 The members 
of the Commission serve in their individual capacity and “shall not receive or accept 
any instructions.”21 Members are appointed by their respective countries, hold 
office for four years, and may be reappointed.22 The individual members are
professors of public law and international law, national judges, practising lawyers, 
members of national parliaments, and civil servants.23 Representatives of the 
Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the 
14. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (Nov. 08, 
2016), http://www.osce.org/. 
15. See generally OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ORGANIZATION 
FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (Nov. 08, 2016, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.osce.org/odihr. 
16. Revised Statute, supra note 8, art. 4; see also Revised Rules of Procedure, supra note 11, art. 6. 
17. Revised Rules of Procedure, supra note 11, art. 6. Gianni Buquicchio has been President 
since December 2009. Gianni Buquicchio, VENICE COMMISSION (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:08 PM), 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=cv_1376. 
18. Venice Commission, Guidelines Relating to the Working Methods of the Commission, at 
II-D, CDL-AD (2010) 034. 
19. Id. at II-C; Revised Rules of Procedure, supra note 11, art. 17a. 
20. Revised Statute, supra note 8, art 2.1. 
21. Id.
22. Id. at arts. 2.2–2.3. 
23. See generally Members of the Venice Commission, VENICE COMMISSION,
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/default.aspx?lang=EN (last visited Nov. 23, 2016). 
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Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, and the Giunta of the 
Regione Veneto may attend the sessions of the Commission.24 The European 
Union is “entitled” to participate in the work of the Commission,25 and the 
Committee of Ministers is empowered to authorise the Commission to invite 
international organisations to participate in its work.26 The Venice Commission may 
also use consultants to facilitate attainment of its objectives.27
REMIT AND ROLE
The Venice Commission’s role is elaborated in Article 1.1 of the Revised 
Statute, which mandates the following objectives: strengthen the understanding of 
the legal systems of the participating states, with a view to bringing them closer; 
promote the rule of law and democracy; and examine the problems raised by the 
working of democratic institutions and their reinforcement and development.28
Article 1.2 instructs the Venice Commission to give priority to work concerning: 
the constitutional, legislative, and administrative principles and techniques, which 
serve the efficiency of democratic institutions and their strengthening, as well as the 
rule of law; fundamental rights and freedoms; and the contribution of local and 
regional self-government to the enhancement of democracy.29 The reality is that the 
Venice Commission works in three broad areas. 
Democratic Institutions and Fundamental Rights 
The first area of the work of the Commission concerns democratic institutions 
and fundamental rights, which includes: the relations between the different 
branches of state power; inter-institutional co-operation; the rule of law; judicial 
reform; protection of fundamental rights; protection of minorities; emergency 
powers; parliamentary immunity; ombudsman institutions; decentralisation; 
federalism and regionalisation; and the interplay between international law and 
human rights.30
Constitutional reform is central to the Venice Commission’s work, including 
the drafting of constitutions, constitutional amendments, and legislation of a 
constitutional nature. The Venice Commission is also concerned with the 
functioning of political institutions, the balance of power between the main state 
organs, and the legal framework of national judicial systems. Opinions on 
fundamental rights constitute a significant part of the Commission’s workload, the 
24. Revised Statute, supra note 8, art. 2.4. 
25. Id. at art. 2.6. 
26. Id. at art. 2.7. 
27. Id. at art. 5. 
28. Id. at art. 1. 
29. Id. at art. 1.1. 
30. Democratic Institutions and Fundamental Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION 
(2014), http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Const_Assistance&lang=EN (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2016). 
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paradigm being whether a state’s law relating to a fundamental right, such as speech, 
is consistent with European and international standards. 
Constitutional Justice 
The second area in which the Venice Commission works is constitutional 
justice.31 From its early years, the Venice Commission facilitated dialogue between 
constitutional courts, as manifest in the 1992 creation of a documentation centre to 
foster mutual exchange of information between the courts, and to inform the public 
about their decisions.32 The Commission established a network of liaison officers 
with constitutional courts. They contribute three times per annum to the Bulletin 
on Constitutional Case-Law and the Commission database CODICES.33 There is a 
facility, the ‘Venice Forum,’ which fosters information exchange between the courts 
on current issues.34
Cooperation between the constitutional courts and the Venice Commission 
was institutionalized post-2002, through the Joint Council on Constitutional Justice 
(JCCJ).35 The JCCJ is co-chaired by one member of the Commission and a liaison 
officer elected by the liaison officers during a meeting of the JCCJ.36 The Venice 
Commission invites constitutional courts and courts of equivalent jurisdiction in its 
member states, associate member states, observer states, and states with special co-
operation status (South Africa, Palestine) to participate in the JCCJ. Courts from 
other States can be invited to JCCJ meetings as special guests.37
The JCCJ is thus the steering body for co-operation between the Venice 
Commission and the constitutional courts. It has responsibility for publication of 
the Bulletin on Constitutional Case-Law,38 which, since 1993, contains summaries 
of the most important decisions submitted by the constitutional courts of circa fifty 
countries, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU). The JCCJ also oversees the CODICES database, 
which is updated three times per year. It contains over 4,000 published summaries 
in the Bulletin and the full texts of approximately 5,000 decisions.39 The Bulletin 
and CODICES make data available from countries whose constitutional decisions 
would not otherwise be readily available. This facilitates research and offers a 
resource to constitutional courts as to how endemic problems have been dealt with 
31. Constitutional Justice, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION (2014),
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Constitutional_Justice&lang=EN (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2016). 
32. Id.
33. CODICES (2016), http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn 
=default.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2016). 
34. Constitutional Justice, supra note 31. 
35. Revised Statute, supra note 8, art. 3.4. 
36. Rules of Procedure art. 18 (No. 14), Venice Commission, 105th Sess., (revised 2015). 
37. Constitutional Justice, supra note 31. 
38. Bulletin on Constitutional Case Law, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION (2014), 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_02_Bulletins. 
39. Constitutional Justice, supra note 31. 
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elsewhere, thereby fostering trans-constitutional exchange of ideas. The JCCJ 
annual meeting is followed by a conference on a topic of current interest concerning 
constitutional justice. 
Elections, Referendums and Political Parties 
The third area in which the Venice Commission is active concerns elections,40
including referendums and political parties.41 The electoral work is undertaken 
under the auspices of the Council for Democratic Elections (CDE) which is a 
tripartite body composed of members of the Venice Commission, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, PACE, and the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities of the Council of Europe.  The CDE and Commission co-operate with 
OSCE/ODIHR. CDE opinions, like other Commission opinions, are subject to 
approval by the plenary of the Venice Commission. 
The Council for Democratic Elections proffers advice and gives opinions 
on electoral legislation. The Venice Commission has adopted approximately 120 
opinions and issued sixty texts of a general character on elections, referendums, and 
political parties.42 Considerable attention has been devoted to codes of good 
electoral practice, analogous documents concerning referendums, and guidelines 
that relate to political parties.43 The Commission also organises the annual 
European Conference of Electoral Management Bodies, provides training for those 
involved in electoral work, and participates in some electoral observation 
missions.44
The Specific and the General 
The Venice Commission’s work is an admixture of opinions concerning 
particular countries, and general studies that draw, inter alia, on these opinions to 
furnish more general guidance on particular fundamental rights or political parties. 
The hope is that these opinions can assist legislators, public authorities, the judiciary, 
and the like.45 Closely related to the general studies are the compilations of extracts 
40. Elections and Referendums, Political Parties, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION 
(2014), http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Elections_and_Referendums&lang 
=EN (last visited, Nov. 23, 2016). 
41. Political Parties, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION (2014), http://www.venice 
.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_parties. 
42. Elections and Referendums, supra note 40. 
43. See, e.g., Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Doc. No. CDL-AD (2002) 23 (revised);
Code of Good Practice on Referendums, Doc. No. CDL-AD (2007) 008; Code of Good Practice in 
the Field of Political Parties, Doc. No. CDL-AD (2009) 021. Guidelines on Political Party Regulation 
by OSCE/ODIHR, Doc. No. CDL-AD (2010) 024. 
44. Seminars, Training Workshops and Assistance Missions, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE 
COMMISSION (2014), http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_seminars (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2016). 
45. See, e.g., Guidelines for Legislative Reviews of Laws relating to Religion or Belief, Doc. No. 
CDL (2004) 061; OSCE/ODIHR—Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly, 2nd ed., Doc. No. CDL-AD (2010) 020; Venice Commission—OSCE/ODIHR Joint 
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from opinions adopted by the Venice Commission in particular areas.46 The 
objective is to provide an overview of doctrine in the particular area, as a reference 
resource for drafters of constitutions and of legislation.47
Such compilations facilitate the task of Venice Commission members when 
preparing an opinion on a particular country, helping to ensure consistency of 
treatment between countries. They are structured thematically and are regularly 
updated. For example, for the compilation concerning freedom of association, the 
principal thematic headings are: definition of freedom of association; national and 
international frame of reference; content of freedom of association; expression of 
freedom of association; legal status and registration of an association; dissolution of 
an association; non-governmental organizations; and, religious or belief 
organizations.48 Such well-structured compilations are an important part of the 
Venice Commission’s work. 
TRIGGERING AND METHODOLOGY
Triggering the Venice Commission 
The Venice Commission has power to produce reports on its own initiative. 
Article 3.1 states that without prejudice to the competence of the organs of the 
Council of Europe, the “Commission may carry out research on its own initiative 
and, where appropriate, may prepare studies and draft guidelines, laws and 
international agreements.” Any proposal from the Commission can then be 
discussed and adopted by the statutory organs of the Council of Europe.49
Article 3.2 lists the institutions/states that can request an opinion from the 
Venice Commission, on a subject that falls within its mandate. 
The Commission may supply, within its mandate, opinions upon request 
submitted by the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, the Secretary 
General, or by a state or international organization or body participating in 
the work of the Commission. Where an opinion is requested by a state on 
Guidelines on Freedom of Association, Doc. No. CDL-AD (2014) 046; Report on the Implementation 
of International Human Rights Treaties in Domestic Law and the Role of the Courts, Doc. No. CDL-
AD (2014) 036. 
46. Compilations of Studies and Opinions, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION (2014), 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=04_Compilations&lang=EN (last visited on Nov. 
23, 2016). 
47. See, e.g., Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions Concerning Freedom of Association, 
Doc. No. CDL-PI (2014) 004; Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions concerning Constitutional 
Provisions for Amending Constitutions, Doc. No. CDL-PI (2015) 023; Compilation of Venice 
Commission Opinions and Reports concerning Political Parties, Doc. No. CDL-PI (2016) 003; 
Compilation of Venice Commission opinions and Reports concerning Gender Equality, Doc. No. 
CDL-PI (2016) 007. 
48. Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions Concerning Freedom of Association, Doc. 
No. (2014) 0004-e http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI%282014%29004 
-e (revised 2014). 
49. Venice Commission Res. 3, Committee of Ministers, 784th Meeting (Feb. 21, 2002). 
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a matter regarding another state, the Commission shall inform the state 
concerned and, unless the two states are in agreement, submit the issue to 
the Committee of Ministers.50
The reality is that most opinions are triggered by requests from a state party 
to the Venice Commission. A state party may seek help in drafting a constitution or 
changes thereto, or it may request assistance because it has learned that a national 
law is in some way deficient, or not fit for its purpose. The reference may also be 
due to some intra-institutional tension within the referring state, whereby the 
request becomes part of some larger struggle between executive and legislature, or 
between rival political parties. The request from the state means, in effect, a request 
from the current governing party and the Venice Commission does not formally 
inquire as to the intra-state political forces that precipitated the reference. These 
forces will, however, invariably become apparent when the working group begins 
its inquiry, aided by documentation provided by the secretariat, and further 
information in this respect will be forthcoming when the Commission undertakes 
its site visit, during which it will talk to a wide range of parties, official and unofficial. 
It might, in a more cynical vein, be felt that state referrals serve as window 
dressing, helping the state to buttress its democratic credentials when it has no 
intention to implement the recommendations. The Venice Commission has no 
formal enforcement mechanism,51 but we should nonetheless be cautious about this 
argument. There may be a plethora of reasons why it proves difficult to effectuate 
Commission recommendations, many of which are consistent with good faith 
motivation for the initial request for help. It is, moreover, doubtful whether a 
rational state actor would act in this way. It sounds simple. The state takes the 
democratic plaudits from asking the Commission for help, while avoiding the costs, 
since it has no intention to comply with the opinion. Matters are more complex. 
The reference to the Commission inevitably lets the genie out of the bottle. The 
defective law is revealed, thoroughly analysed, and there is a site visit to the country 
in which the working group talk to official and non-official players alike. The 
outcome of the process is not predictable when the state makes the request for 
assistance, and any benefits it secures from willingness to make the referral would 
be significantly outweighed by the costs if it becomes apparent that the state had no 
interest in implementing the opinion. 
It is clear from Article 3.2 that the Venice Commission can also be triggered 
by other bodies.52 The Parliamentary Assembly for the Council of Europe is the 
source of many such requests.53 There are inevitable differences in the ‘tone and 
feel’ of an opinion that has not been requested by the state, especially where it does 
50. Id.
51. Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions, Reports, and Studies on Constitutional 
Justice, Doc. No. CDL-PI (20015) 002, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL 
-PI(2015)002-e. 
52. Venice Commission Res. 3, supra note 49. 
53. Id.
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not want such scrutiny, and the relationship between the Commission and the state 
can be more adversarial in such instances.54
The Venice Commission’s expertise can, in addition, be triggered by a state 
that is not a member by making a request to the Committee of Ministers.55 At the 
request of a constitutional court or the ECHR, the Venice Commission can also 
provide amicus curiae opinions not on the constitutionality of the act concerned 
but on comparative constitutional and international law issues.56
Working Methodology of the Venice Commission 
The way in which opinions are prepared is determined by the Guidelines on 
Working Methods,57 and by practice that has evolved over time. When a reference 
has been made to the Venice Commission, a working group, of normally between 
four and six people, is established. These are the rapporteurs, who are national 
members of the Venice Commission.58 They are selected to the working group for 
their expertise over the subject matter, and their availability to contribute within the 
time frame. The temporal dimension is important in this respect, the reality being 
that for a plethora of reasons most Venice Commission opinions have to be 
produced within tight timelines.59 The rapporteurs are assisted by a member of the 
secretariat.60 The secretariat proposes the time schedule for preparation of the draft 
opinion or study, and provides the rapporteurs with information concerning the 
background of the request, the national legislation, the applicable standards, and 
previous Commission work that is relevant.61
The draft opinion will be produced by the rapporteurs, in conjunction with 
the member of the secretariat. The rapporteurs are sent the preceding material from 
the secretariat that is translated into English or French. In the paradigm situation all 
rapporteurs on the working group write an individual report on the issues raised by 
the request for an opinion. There is normally no direct collaboration between the 
54.   Id.
55.   Revised Statute, supra note 8, art. 3.3. 
56.  See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief on the case Santiago Bryson de la Barra et. al. (on crimes 
against humanity) for the Constitutional Court of Peru, Doc. No. CDL-AD (2011) 041; Amicus Curiae 
Brief for the Constitutional Court of Georgia on the non ultra petita rule in criminal cases, Doc. No. 
CDL-AD (2015) 016; Republic of Moldova—Amicus Curiae Brief for the Constitutional Court on the 
Right of Recourse by the State against Judges, Doc. No. CDL-AD (2016) 015. 
57. Founding Documents, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION,
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_founding_documents&lang=EN (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2016). 
58. COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION, GUIDELINES RELATED TO THE WORKING 
METHODS OF THE VENICE COMMISSION, 4 (2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. Any member of the 
Commission may indicate an interest in becoming a member of a particular working group, provided 
that he or she is in a position to participate within the relevant time-frame. Id.
59. GUIDELINES, supra note 58, at 4 (providing that “the rapporteurs will present their 
observations and text proposals in due time to enable the Secretariat to prepare a draft (consolidated) 
opinion within the time limit previously agreed upon”). 
60. Id.
61. Id. at 5. 
2017] Transnational Constitution-Making 67 
individual rapporteurs, although it is possible for the working group to meet 
between Commission sessions.62  The member of the secretariat then produces a 
draft opinion, which draws on the views of the individual rapporteurs. This is 
circulated to the working group, who can suggest amendments. The proposed 
amendments are circulated to the working group, and a consensus is reached on the 
draft opinion that represents the view of the working group as a whole. In some 
cases the procedure is different: where the subject matter is large, as with the 
drafting of a constitution, the individual rapporteurs may be assigned specific issues. 
The reports from the rapporteurs will be collated by the member of the secretariat, 
and the draft opinion will be circulated to all rapporteurs, who can suggest 
amendments to the draft text.
The draft opinion thus produced will analyse the issue against the backdrop of 
the relevant standards, the content of which will be considered below. It is normal 
for there to be a site visit to the country. This might not occur where there has 
already been extensive discourse between the Commission and the state when the 
opinion was being drafted, or because the state does not allow the Commission to 
enter its territory. The Commission has no right to enter a state without its consent. 
Thus, there can be difficulties where the Commission has been triggered by a 
request from a body other than the state itself, although the reality is that even in 
such instances the state normally does allow the Commission to visit.
The site visit serves two related purposes. It provides an opportunity for the 
state to have a “voice” and proffer observations in response to questions posed by 
the working group. The questions focus on issues that the group regards as 
problematic from the work that it has undertaken thus far. The site visit also enables 
the working group to make contact with civil society and other interested 
stakeholders. This may be especially important where the reference to the Venice 
Commission was made by a body other than the state. However, even where the 
reference has been made by the state, the site visit provides a “voice” to non-
governmental bodies that will often bring perspectives to bear that complement, 
supplement, or contradict those of the official state entities.
The final draft opinion is prepared after the site visit. It is sent to all 
Commission members two weeks before the plenary session,63 including the 
representatives of the state that is the subject of the report, who will normally 
receive it slightly earlier than the other members of the Commission.64 The final 
draft opinion may be considered by a sub-commission, which meets the day before 
the plenary session. There can be discussion between the rapporteurs and the state 
prior to the plenary. The final draft opinion is then presented to the plenary session 
by one of the rapporteurs. This is followed by opportunity for comment by the state 
62. Id. at 4. 
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4-5 (providing that when the national situation so requires, the President, in 
consultation with the Bureau, may authorise that the rapporteurs’ opinion that has not yet been adopted 
to be sent to the national authorities prior to its adoption at the plenary). 
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that is the subject of the report. The state may make comments concerning the 
factual accuracy of the opinion; contest the working group’s interpretation of its 
law, or its compatibility with international standards; or query the specific 
recommendations. When the state has voiced its view at the plenary, the floor is 
opened for any other member of the plenary to comment.
How much discussion takes place at the plenary perforce varies. At one end 
of the spectrum is the situation where the opinion was requested by the state, which 
is content with the recommendations, more especially because the state discussed 
the issues during the site visit and subsequent thereto. In such instances discussion 
at the plenary is brief. At the other end of the spectrum is a situation where the 
opinions originate from references by bodies other than the state, where the state is 
not happy with the scrutiny or with the opinion, notwithstanding its opportunities 
to have a “voice” adumbrated above. In such instances discussion can be more 
protracted and heated. There are of course intermediate positions along this 
spectrum.
It should, moreover, be emphasized that discourse continues throughout the 
process. Thus, if the plenary discussion reveals contestable issues that had not been 
fully recognized hitherto, the rapporteurs may acknowledge a point, and the final 
draft opinion is accepted subject to the point being addressed. The rapporteurs will 
then meet on the day of the plenary, draft an amendment to the relevant point, and 
circulate the amendment to the plenary. The opinion is made public when it has 
been adopted by the plenary, and is then available on the Commission website. The 
dialogic nature of the process is captured by this statement on the Commission 
website:
The Commission does not seek to impose the solutions set out in its 
opinions. Rather, it adopts a non-directive approach based on dialogue and 
shares member states’ experience and practices. For this reason, a working 
group visits the country concerned to meet the various stakeholders and 
to assess the situation as objectively as possible. The authorities are also 
able to submit comments on the draft opinions to the Commission.65
THE VENICE COMMISSION, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS AND 
CONSTITUTION-MAKING
Transnational Legal Orders
The discussion thus far has been concerned principally with explication. The 
focus now shifts to evaluation, and this is framed within the emerging literature on 
transnational legal orders (“TLOs”). Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer define 
TLOs as “a collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and 
actors that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across 
65. The Commission’s Activities, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION, (2014) http://
www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN. 
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national jurisdictions.”66 The term “associated organization” is construed broadly 
to include any organization or social formation, so too is the term “actor,” which 
includes collective actors and individuals whose activities span national boundaries. 
The concept of order within TLO thought is conceived of in terms of shared 
social norms and institutions that orient social expectations, communication, and 
behavior. Much social ordering is achieved through law, and “this ordering becomes 
authoritative when the legal norms become accepted and institutionalized across 
national jurisdictions,”67 whereby the normative orientation of those applying the 
law are changed and their behavior affected. 
A TLO is legal “when it involves international or transnational legal 
organizations or networks, directly or indirectly engages multiple national and local 
legal institutions, and assumes a recognizable legal form.”68 The resulting 
transnational legal norms may reflect pre-existing national ones, such as those of 
powerful nation-states, or they “may reflect norms developed by private parties and 
networks through bottom-up processes,”69 such that trans-national organizations 
and networks are “part of the process of the legal norms’ formation, conveyance, 
and potential institutionalization.”70 For Halliday and Shaffer, the legal dimension 
of TLOs does not, however, require a “single hierarchy of norms, nor is it always 
formally binding, nor is it invariably backed by coercion.”71
A legal order thus defined is transnational insofar as it orders social 
relationships in some way that transcends the nation state. It is clear, moreover, that 
“TLOs span legal orders that vary in their geographic scope, from bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements to private transnational codes to regional governance bodies 
to global regulatory ordering.”72 They can evolve over time; there may be more than 
one TLO that covers a particular substantive area; and there may be contestation 
between TLOs that cover the same area, or where the coverage of TLOs overlaps.73
There can be various catalysts for the creation of TLOs.74 There might be a 
disjunction between national regulation and global markets in light of changes in 
economic interdependence; the driving force might be technological change; or it 
might be the ascendancy of certain political ideals that are regarded as central for 
state legitimacy, such that states employ TLOs to advance such ideals. Transnational 
theory is recursive, in the sense that it integrates the study of law production and 
law implementation within a single frame, assessing how “the production and 
implementation of transnational legal norms among international, transnational, 
66. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2. 
67. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 8. 
68. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 11. 
69. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 12. 
70. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2.
71. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 18. 
72. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 18-19. 
73. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 30. 
74. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 32. 
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national, and local lawmakers and law practitioners dynamically and recursively 
affect each other.”75
The Venice Commission and Transnational Legal Orders 
The study of TLOs provides a helpful frame for consideration of the Venice 
Commission, which plays an important transnational role in the dispersion of legal 
norms concerning democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. This is readily 
apparent from three related perspectives on the Venice Commission’s function, 
membership, and values. 
(i) Function 
The Commission’s origins were adumbrated above; it became a part of the 
Council of Europe (CoE) following the initiative from Antonio La Pergola. This 
enhanced the role of both institutional actors, since they performed complementary 
functions. The CoE was already part of a TLO that fostered human rights and the 
rule of law, most prominently through the ECHR (the Strasbourg Court). The 
Strasbourg Court, in common with other judicial institutions, was primarily 
concerned with fire-fighting—dealing with particular adjudicative problems when 
cases were brought to the Court—although its judgments could have some effect 
on shaping state behaviour ex ante. The Venice Commission offered the CoE the 
opportunity for more generalized intervention ex ante. The Commission could give 
opinions on constitutions, legislation and the like, with the objective of fire 
prevention. In this way, the Commission could help to avoid problems concerning 
human rights and the rule of law arising within a state, or suggest ways in which 
they could be addressed through reform of the constitution or law that was the 
source of the problem. 
From the perspective of the nascent Venice Commission, the institutional 
home within the CoE was equally beneficial not only because the Commission could 
tap into CoE institutional resources but also because the association meant that the 
Venice Commission did not have to build its legitimacy from scratch. Association 
with the CoE meant that the Venice Commission was not just another organization 
among many seeking to promote human rights. 
The agreement whereby the Venice Commission became part of the CoE thus 
strengthened both players. It provided the Council of Europe with the opportunity, 
through the Venice Commission, to shape the post-communist political order by 
providing advice on the establishment of more liberal democratic regimes within 
the relevant states. This was regarded both as an intrinsic good, and was also 
perceived more instrumentally as a way of strengthening the polities that had 
hitherto been communist regimes. 
75. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 38. 
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(ii) Membership 
The relationship between the CoE and the Venice Commission also enhanced 
this TLO through overlapping membership. The Commission did not actively have 
to solicit states to become members, since it could tap directly into the existing 
membership of the CoE. This provided the initial core of Commission members, 
and also fuelled its expansion as ex-Communist states joined the CoE during the 
1990s. It increased the immediate client base, and did so through the addition of 
states that were most likely to call on the Commission for assistance, since they 
sought help to ensure that their constitutions and laws were in accord with a liberal 
democratic ordering. 
It should also be acknowledged that there are states that are members of the 
Venice Commission, such as Russia, that are unlikely to request assistance and are 
likely to resist inquiries when they are triggered by an institutional player. It begs the 
question as to why they remain within the Council of Europe, since it is their 
membership of CoE that provides the linkage with membership of the Commission. 
The answer to that broader question takes us beyond the scope of this article. 
Suffice it to say for the present that viewed from the perspective of the rational state 
actor, Russia must believe that the gains of legitimacy from membership outweigh 
the costs in terms of challenges to Russian laws through the ECHR, and the Venice 
Commission, although there are signs that Russia wishes to limit the impact of both 
arms of the CoE while still remaining a member.76
Membership expanded further post-2002, when states that were not party to 
the CoE were allowed to become members of the Commission.77 The revised 
statute allowing for non-CoE members to join the Commission was initially driven 
by the desire of such states to become full members, though these states were 
pushing at an open door as far as the Commission was concerned, since the 
expanded membership enhanced its status. The reasons why such states sought 
membership are eclectic, ranging from the straightforward desire to tap into the 
Commission’s expertise when framing constitutions and laws, to the legitimacy 
gains for the state by becoming a full member. The rationale was different in the 
case of the United States of America, since neither of the preceding reasons have 
much purchase in explaining its transition from observer status to full member. This 
transition was probably driven by the desire to lend support to an organization that 
was perceived to be a force for the maintenance of liberal democratic ordering and 
stability in Europe and beyond, which would be in accord with more general 
precepts of U.S. foreign policy. 
The Commission membership of sixty states is diverse, and this has 
augmented the recursive nature of the Commission’s modus operandi. The 
Commission, as will be seen more fully below, utilizes a blend of hard and soft law 
76. VENICE COMMISSION, Russian Federation-Final Opinion on the Amendments to the Federal 
Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court, CDL-AD (2016) 016-e (June 2016). 
77. Revised Statute, supra note 8. 
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when writing opinions. The very diversity of membership, which is replicated within 
working groups, highlights the need for plurality in the application of Commission 
values, and serves as a constant reminder of the need to be cognizant of local 
circumstance when applying such values. 
There is a further dimension to membership that enhanced this TLO with 
respect to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The Commission 
membership rules institutionalize cooperation with other prominent institutional 
actors that form part of this TLO, most notably the European Commission and 
OSCE/ODIHR, while leaving it open for the Venice Commission to liaise on a 
more ad hoc basis with other organizations. Liaison between the Venice 
Commission and the European Commission has been especially prominent in 
relation to rule of law problems that have arisen in EU countries, such as Hungary 
and Poland, while cooperation with OSCE/ODIHR is most common in the 
context of elections. 
(iii) Values 
The values advanced by the CoE and the Venice Commission are democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law. The Commission plays an important role in this 
TLO. It is, drawing on Halliday and Shaffer, one of the associated organizations 
that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national 
jurisdictions within this domain. There are many other organizations that make 
important contributions to the TLO concerned with human rights and the rule of 
law, but the Commission’s contribution is nonetheless distinctive and flows from 
its institutional structure. 
Its membership of two representatives from each state, combined with the 
institutional support of the secretariat, means that the Commission is capable of 
responding to numerous requests for assistance at any one point in time. The 
institutional capacity to accept multiple requests for assistance that require detailed 
evaluation of national constitutions and laws within a tight time frame enables the 
Commission to make a distinctive contribution to constitutional reform. This is 
further enhanced by the diversity of membership, which means that those with 
expertise and cultural understanding can be combined on the same panel. This has 
in turn facilitated the development of databases, compilations, and the like, which 
furnish guidance on particular areas such as speech, association, assembly, and good 
electoral practice. The authority of the formalized legal norms within this area is 
thereby enhanced. Implementation is, as we shall see below, not perfect. There can, 
moreover, be contestation as to the ‘correct’ application of such values in a 
particular instance, but much of this occurs within the frame of the underlying 
values that are central to this TLO. 
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There is, however, as Kim Scheppele has cogently argued,78 increased evidence 
of states seeking to cloak themselves with the garb of constitutionalism, while 
seeking to undermine it from within. This in itself provides interesting evidence 
about the evolution of TLOs, as the established TLO within the relevant area is 
challenged, with the possible emergence of a rival TLO. The Venice Commission 
nonetheless exemplifies the following principle enunciated by Halliday and Shaffer: 
It is a demonstrable premise of constructivist theory in international 
relations scholarship that the ability of an international organization to 
promulgate norms that are widely adopted by nation-states across the 
world is likely to increase the power of those international organizations 
themselves. That is to say, the transnational propagators of legal norms 
become more than the sum of the interests of nation-states – they become 
emergent actors in their own right and thus come to exert organizational 
interests that cannot be reduced to an amalgam of their constituent state 
delegations.79
The Venice Commission and Constitutions 
There are at least four “sedimentary” layers that can be discerned in the study 
of constitutions: the making and terms of the constitution itself; constitutional 
amendment; legislation that impacts directly or indirectly the meaning and 
application of the constitutional terms; and constitutional practice, whether in the 
form of institutional conventions, or perceptions of the constitution by the people. 
Constitution-making broadly conceived is an important part of the Venice 
Commission’s work,80 as confirmed by the large number of opinions that have dealt 
with this issue.81 The Commission’s work in this area is dependent on a reference 
being made by the relevant state, or another institution that is entitled to do so, and 
this will determine the scope of the opinion. Commission’s opinions have addressed 
three out of the four aspects of constitutions set out above.
First, there are opinions that concern the drafting and terms of the 
constitution, or significant parts thereof. This is exemplified by Commission 
opinions on Tunisia,82 Iceland,83 Bosnia and Hercegovina,84 Hungary,85 Moldova,86
78. KIM SCHEPPELE, Worst Practices and the Transnational Legal Order, or (How to Build a 
Constitutional “Democratorship” in Plain Sight), (forthcoming 2016). 
79. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 59. 
80. Constitutional Reform, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION, (2014) http://www
.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_Reforms&lang=EN (last visited Nov. 23, 2016). 
81. Documents by topic, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: VENICE COMMISSION, (2014) http://www.venice 
.coe.int/webforms/documents/?topic=4&year=all (last visited Nov. 23, 2016). 
82. VENICE COMMISSION, Opinion on the Final Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, CDL-
AD(2013)032-e (Oct. 2013). 
83. Opinion on the Draft New Constitution of Iceland, CDL-AD (2013)010-e (Mar. 11, 2013). 
84. Opinions on the Constitutional Regime of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CDL-INF (1998) 015-
e (July 1, 1998). 
85. Opinion on the New Constitution of Hungary, CDL-AD (2011)016-e (June 20, 2011). 
86. Co-operation Between the Venice Commission and the Republic of Moldova on 
Constitutional Reform, CDL-INF (2001) 003-e (Jan. 24, 2001). 
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and Armenia.87 While the scope of the Commission opinions differed in these cases, 
they exemplify its role in advising on the constitution as a whole, or in proffering 
advice on parts that were central to the constitutional schema of that particular 
country.
Second, there are a large number of opinions dealing with constitutional 
amendments. The process of constitutional reform is often complex and lengthy. 
In some countries it has spanned several years, with changes wrought through 
constitutional amendments. The catalysts for such amendments vary. In some 
instances it is the realization that the initial constitutional design is imperfect; in 
others it is the result of new political configurations that wish to re-shape the 
country’s institutional and constitutional architecture; in yet other instances, the 
motives may be darker, such that current majorities seek to reinforce their power 
through constitutional amendments designed, for example, to limit the power of 
the judiciary.88 An overview of the Commission’s many opinions can be gleaned 
from its compilation on constitutional amendments,89 and its conceptual approach 
to constitutional amendment is evident in a separate report on the topic.90
Third, there is an even larger group of opinions concerned with legislation that 
fleshes out constitutional provisions. It is not fortuitous that the Commission 
website on constitutional reform lists, inter alia, the following issues: checks and 
balances between powers and the principle of inter-institutional co-operation; 
delegation of legislative powers; judicial reform; guarantees for the rule of law and 
fundamental rights and freedoms; electoral systems; and issues related to local self-
government and decentralization.91 It might be felt that we should demarcate the 
constitution, its making and its provisions, from all else. The influences that shape 
the making of the constitution and the content of its provisions are clearly central. 
Counting how many constitutions contain provisions of a particular kind is of some 
help, albeit limited. It is nonetheless normatively and pragmatically mistaken to draw 
a rigid line between the constitution and legislation that is designed to fill out the 
meaning of the constitution’s provisions, and it is misguided to elide the existence 
of the same provision in many constitutions with equivalence of application. 
Constitutional legislation is in many respects the lifeblood of the constitution. 
Other things being equal, the thinner the constitution and the more abstract its 
provisions, the greater the role for constitutional legislation and adjudication to 
imbue the terms with more concrete meaning. Such legislation is nonetheless 
important in all constitutions, although its incidence may vary. The constitution may 
contain noble provisions concerning free and fair elections, but the reality can only 
87. First Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution (Chapters 1 to 7 and 10) of 
the Republic of Armenia, CDL-AD (2015) 037-e (Oct. 29, 2015). 
88. Scheppele, supra note 78, at 29. 
89. Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions Concerning Constitutional Provisions for 
Amending the Constitution, CDL-PI (2015) 023 (Dec. 22, 2015). 
90. Report on Constitutional Amendment, CDL-AD (2010)001 (Jan. 19, 2010). 
91. Constitutional Reform, supra, note 80. 
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be tested by examination of the detailed electoral legislation that puts flesh on these 
constitutional bones. There may be laudable constitutional guarantees for political 
parties, only for these to be heavily circumscribed by legislation that defines the 
qualifications for a political party to appear on the ballot. The force of constitutional 
protections for free speech may be qualified by legislative rules related to 
association. The need to be mindful of the link between constitutional terms and 
consequent legislation is important in relation to many other issues commonly 
found in constitutions, such as principles concerning equality, the judiciary and the 
like, which are then articulated in more detail in, or affected by, legislation. The 
importance of this linkage is repeatedly attested to by Commission opinions. 
It is instructive to relate the preceding discussion back to that concerning 
TLOs. It would be possible to conceive of a TLO that was solely concerned with 
the making and terms of constitutions. We would then, in accord with Halliday and 
Shaffer’s definition, identify the “collection of formalized legal norms and 
associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and 
practice of law across national jurisdictions”92 in this respect. The reality is that a 
TLO thus conceived would miss much if it excluded the second or third dimension 
articulated above. Nor would this sit easily with the emphasis placed on national law 
in TLO discourse and on the recursive nature of TLO theory, which accords 
prominence to the way in which “the production and implementation of 
transnational legal norms among international, transnational, national, and local 
lawmakers and law practitioners dynamically and recursively affect each other.”93 A 
distinctive contribution made by the Commission to constitutional study is that it 
provides a window into the interaction between the constitution, amendments 
thereto, and constitutional legislation, through the many Commission opinions that 
exemplify this relationship. 
THE VENICE COMMISSION, PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE
TLO theory deals with high-profile issues such as human rights or the rule of 
law, the meaning and application of which can be contestable. We should consider 
carefully the process through which determinations are made, and the substantive 
criteria used when making them.94 It is only by doing so that we can draw any 
rounded conclusion concerning the normative contribution made by a particular 
TLO.
Process and Procedural Rights
Maartje de Visser has argued that greater procedural formality is desirable 
when the Commission produces its opinions, contending that the current flexibility 
92. HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 5. 
93. Id. at 38. 
94. Much of the critical literature concerning bodies such as the World Trade Organization that 
constitute part of a TLO performs this function. 
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“may inadvertently undermine the quality and usefulness of its assistance to national 
constitution makers.”95 She perceives a lack of homogeneity concerning the 
evidence used to evaluate a draft constitution, and is concerned that an opinion did 
not discuss a source she believes should have been considered.96 De Visser also 
believes that there should be a more “comprehensive procedural framework to 
govern the Commission’s functioning.”97 This should, says de Visser, address the 
participatory rights of the country investigated, and the composition of the working 
group. There should be a procedural obligation to undertake a site visit, and the 
national authorities should be able to comment on the rapporteurs’ draft opinion 
after the country visit.98
Two comments can be made on these suggestions. First, there is a danger in 
expecting too much homogeneity between the evidentiary foundations of different 
reports, or between sources discussed in any particular report. The danger is that 
the best can be the enemy of the good. It is always possible to criticize a particular 
report because a commentator believes that a source should have been discussed in 
greater detail. It should be remembered that opinions are produced under time 
constraints, and that most rapporteurs have “day jobs,” whether as judges, 
academics, practising lawyers and the like. The opinions are not, and are not 
intended to be, doctoral theses. 
Second, there is a case for looking at the current procedural rules and working 
methods, with a view to improvement. The process rights of the state are clearly 
important, more so given that the Venice Commission is in the business of ensuring 
respect for the rule of law, a central component of which is the precept audi alteram 
partem. Deciding what due process demands in this respect is difficult, since the devil 
is always in the detail. 
The default position is that a site visit takes place, subject to the exigencies 
mentioned above. The secretariat may indicate to the state the questions that will 
be raised prior to the visit. Where this is not so, the discussion during the visit alerts 
the state to the causes for Commission disquiet. If a draft opinion exists before the 
site visit this will be a preliminary document and is not therefore disclosed prior to 
the visit. When the national situation so requires, the president, in consultation with 
the bureau, may authorise that the rapporteurs’ opinion that has not yet been 
adopted can be sent to the national authorities prior to its consideration at the 
plenary. Subject to this, the state is sent the final draft opinion before the plenary, 
and its representatives are able to comment at the plenary and on occasion at a sub-
commission prior to the plenary. 
The audi alteram partem principle is therefore clearly met insofar as the state has 
the opportunity to proffer comments prior to the adoption of the final draft opinion 
95. de Visser, supra note 1, at 965. 
96. Id. at 980. 
97. Id. at 992. 
98. Id. at 995. 
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by the plenary.99 There is, in addition, discretion for the state to be sent the final 
draft opinion earlier than normal. It is, moreover, not uncommon, for amendments 
to be made to the opinion as a result of comments at the plenary. The state will also 
have the opportunity to proffer views during the site visit. 
The key issue is therefore whether the state should be able to see the 
preliminary draft opinion before the final draft is completed. The argument in 
favour is that it would enable the state to have a more detailed idea of Commission 
thinking. The argument against is that prior to finalization the draft opinion is a 
work in progress. Problematic issues may become apparent during the visit that 
were not apparent hitherto, the danger being that state authorities might resist 
change to the preliminary opinion. The site visit would become a detailed 
“negotiation” of the preliminary draft opinion, thereby precluding discussion of the 
salient issues, and if certain issues were not identified in the preliminary draft 
opinion, the state authorities would not mention them.
Substantive Criteria and Standards 
(i) Hard and Soft Law Standards 
The Venice Commission commonly distinguishes between hard and soft law 
standards when producing its opinions and studies.
The paradigm hard law standard is the European Convention on Human 
Rights (the “Convention”) and the jurisprudence of the ECHR. The case law of the 
Strasbourg Court affords signatory states latitude in the application of the 
Convention rights through the margin of appreciation. There is therefore some 
room for cultural and normative heterogeneity, and the status accorded to 
Strasbourg Court judgments within a signatory state is determined by that legal 
order.
Subject to this, adherence to the Convention is binding as hard law for parties 
thereto. Article 46(1) of the Convention imposes a binding obligation to comply 
with Strasbourg judgments, since it states that “the High Contracting Parties 
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are 
parties.”100 The peremptory force of Article 46(1) was emphasized by the Strasbourg 
Court in the Scozzari case,101 where it made clear that it was incumbent on the state 
not just to pay those concerned in the instant case, but also to take measures to end 
the cause of the violation.
The Venice Commission also makes considerable use of soft law standards, 
the nature of which can vary, as is clear in the following extract from Gianni 
Buquicchio and Simona Granata-Menghini. 
99. See, e.g., Hlophe v. Constitutional Court of South Africa and Others, no. 08/22932, 
ZAGPHC 289, §20 (Sept. 25, 2008). 
100. European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 46(1), Nov. 4, 1950. 
101. Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, App. nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, EUR. CT. H.R. 
2000-VIII. 
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In addition to hard law standards, the Venice Commission also assesses 
the compliance of constitutional and legal texts with soft law standards (e.g. 
recommendations by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe) or best practices (for example, the guidelines prepared by the 
Venice Commission together with the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) on freedom of assembly, political parties and 
freedom of religion; these are a combination of hard law standards, their 
interpretation and best practices). It also examines the expediency and 
workability of the constitutional or legal models actually chosen. These are 
areas where the standards are not fully binding and are not formulated in 
clear, univocal terms. States dispose therefore of a much broader margin 
of appreciation and are free to choose their own model. When there are 
several options equally in line with the standards, as is often the case, it is 
not the role of the Commission to express its preference, but only to 
indicate which option in its view better fits the situation in the country and 
whether it may function in practice.102
This accurately captures Venice Commission practice. Some sources are an 
admixture of hard and soft law, such as the Commission guidelines and 
compilations, which contain a core of hard law, since they draw on Strasbourg Court 
jurisprudence. The balance between hard and soft law within any particular opinion 
will perforce vary. If the issue falls four-square in the realm of human rights where 
there is extensive case law, then hard law will predominate in the opinion. If the 
focus of the opinion is on broader issues of constitutional design, or the 
configuration of organs of government, then soft law will assume greater 
importance.
(ii) Universality and Plurality 
The other factor that markedly affects the substance of the reports is the 
balance between universality and plurality/diversity, as attested to by several 
commentators. Thus, Jeffrey Jowell noted that while the “Commission possessed 
the self-assurance to insist that democracy contains a set of absolute standards from 
which there is limited scope for deviation,” it was nonetheless sensitive to 
“differences in culture and context in which democracy has to be rooted,” such that 
“the advice it dispenses properly takes into account the differing situations of 
countries with varied backgrounds and experience.”103
Sergio Bartole echoed a similar theme when talking of the Commission’s 
approach to central and east European countries that were making the transition to 
democracy. He denied that adherence to a European constitutional heritage meant 
that “the constitutional choices of the new democracies be completely subordinated 
to strict guidelines provided by international organizations: rather the 
102. BUQUICCHIO AND GRANATA-MENGHINI, supra note 1, at 244. 
103. Jowell, supra note 3, at 682. 
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implementation of European constitutional heritage implies respect for state 
sovereignty,”104 as manifest in the use of standards, which allowed some choice to 
the affected state.105
In similar vein, Buquicchio and Granata-Menghini stated that choices 
between, for example, parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential regimes, 
were primarily for the state concerned, since each could be consistent with 
democracy.106 They emphasized that even hard law standards were obligations of 
result, rather than means. They counseled against the temptation to think that 
models from one state could be readily transplanted to another, stating that before 
consideration is given to borrowing a model from elsewhere “its compatibility with 
the different legal political and social context needs to be tested.”107
(iii) Critique and Response 
There may be differences of view concerning the Commission’s evaluation in 
a particular opinion. This is to be expected, given that application of abstract 
constitutional precepts can be contestable. De Visser is more generally critical of 
the Commission, stating at the outset that her study reveals “gratuitous 
inconsistencies in the manner in which the substantive evaluation of domestic 
constitutional texts is carried out and, in a related vein, highlights missed 
opportunities to give optimal guidance to national constitutional drafters.”108
Suffice it to say at the outset that talk of “gratuitous inconsistencies” is either 
misplaced, or de Visser is setting the bar very high to sustain her allegation of 
inconsistency qualified by this adjectival form, especially given that it is based on 
evaluation of only four opinions. 
The nub of her argument is that the Venice Commission is in danger of taking 
the notion of “common constitutional heritage” too far, by moving beyond 
constitutional principle to the more detailed manner of implementation in a way 
that is not sustainable. Thus, while de Visser acknowledges that the Commission 
seeks to provide assistance to states by giving more concrete guidance, she 
nonetheless cautions that “an overly broad catalogue of elements that together make 
up the common heritage is misconceived and could in the long run even become a 
cause of disenchantment with the Venice Commission’s provision of constitutional 
guidance,”109 and that a more diversified analytical framework would be preferable. 
The danger that de Visser sees in crossing the line between constitutional 
principle and implementation is that “states may feel that their autonomy in 
fashioning constitutional arrangements is unduly circumscribed,” rendering it less 
likely that states will adhere to Commission recommendations. By way of contrast, 
104. Bartole, Final Remarks, supra note 1, at 353. 
105. Id. at 355. 
106. Buquicchio & Granata-Menghini, supra note 1, at 244. 
107. Id. at 246. 
108. de Visser, supra note 1, at 973. 
109. Id. at 999. 
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“keeping the focus on principles avoids the trap of undue optimism on the 
incidence and extent of constitutional convergence, let alone constitutional 
universalism.”110 The Venice Commission should not, says de Visser, refrain from 
considering the implementation of constitutional principles altogether, but “should 
eschew conceiving of the operationalization of such principles as part of the 
common heritage as such.”111
There are three related points that should be made in relation to this critique. 
First, the line between constitutional principles and their operationalization is not 
always easy to draw. If constitutional principles remain at too high a level of 
abstraction they risk becoming empty vessels, capable of justifying almost any 
constitutional arrangement, democratic or otherwise. There are many instances 
where issues related to “operationalization” are crucial to realization of the 
constitutional principle, and where conversely it makes little sense to speak of such 
a principle without being cognizant of the manner of its implementation.
Second, the Venice Commission acknowledges the central concerns voiced by 
de Visser, and has always done so. The previous extracts from members of the 
Commission and the secretariat reveal awareness of the tensions between 
universality and plurality. They repeatedly counsel against the idea that there is a 
one-size-fits-all constitutional model. They articulate the distinction between hard 
and soft law standards, whereby the state has greater latitude in relation to the latter. 
This is accepted chapter and verse in Commission thinking, and is a standard feature 
in Commission opinions.
Third, the reality is that states refer issues to the Commission to gain specific 
guidance on the constitutional acceptability of specific laws. To depict the Venice 
Commission’s modus operandi as one which imposes constitutional specifics on 
unwilling recipients, who are disturbed by intrusion into their autochthonous space, 
is to convey a misleading impression of everyday Commission business. The 
paradigm reference is one in which the state seeks help in relation to a particular 
law that it feels, or has been told, is deficient in some respects. The Commission is 
mindful of the need to respect local difference, and to acknowledge legitimate 
plurality and diversity. The bottom line is nonetheless that the state seeks something 
concrete to improve the law that was the subject of the referral. It is, moreover, 
instructive to note that the incentive for the Commission to imbue abstract concepts 
such as the rule of law with more concrete content has often come from newer 
democracies, who wish for more specific guidance on what the concept entails.
THE VENICE COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE AND IMPACT
We have already seen that classic coercive enforcement is not a condition 
precedent for the existence of a TLO, or for an organization to be regarded as part 
thereof. The extent of compliance is nonetheless important, since it is a factor that 
110. Id. at 1000. 
111. Id. at 1001. 
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affects the extent to which the TLO’s legal norms can be said authoritatively to 
order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions. 
Compliance and the Addressee 
The data on the impact of Venice Commission opinions on the addressees is 
regrettably thin, since there is no systematic method through which the Commission 
is cognizant of the extent to which its recommendations have been followed, 
notwithstanding space allotted on the plenary agenda for follow up on previously 
adopted opinions.112 The data may, somewhat paradoxically, become apparent if 
the state becomes a repeat player in relation to the same issue. This does not alter 
the fact that systematic compliance data is not readily available. This problem could 
be alleviated relatively simply if Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem’s suggestion were to be 
acted upon. He argued that, 
At a minimum, those states that initiate requests to the VC on their own 
could be obligated to report, inter alia, about the implementation of 
recommendations in a systematic, comprehensive, and reliable manner. 
The same could also be asked from member states when requests are 
initiated by other authorities, such as the Parliamentary Assembly. 
Moreover, the members appointed to the VC by member states could be 
tasked with helping the Secretariat document and evaluate implementation 
efforts and making themselves available to the plenum for further 
questions.113
This is a sensible proposal. There will, to be sure, be instances where states 
prove recalcitrant and fail to provide the requisite information, testimony to the fact 
that the world is imperfect, and that the Commission has no enforcement 
mechanism. The proposal nonetheless embodies a clear obligation, and failure to 
comply will be indicative of prima facie non-compliance, and thereby facilitate 
further inquiry. The very fact that there are differences of view as to implementation 
rates bears testimony to the importance of securing better information in this 
regard. 
Thus, on one view implementation is the norm when states request a 
reference. This view has been voiced by Pieter van Dijk.114 It has been echoed by 
Buquicchio and Granata-Menghini, who state that “when the opinion requests 
come from the interested States themselves, it is the rule that they are followed, in 
part or in full.”115 By way of contrast Hoffmann-Riem regarded that assessment as 
“probably too optimistic,”116 based on analysis of data concerning implementation 
112. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Annotated 
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from a sample of opinions between 2009 and mid-way through 2012. He concluded 
that in some instances states did not take up the recommendations, although this 
was in part explicable because “the project submitted for review–including in 
reaction to the criticism by the VC–was abandoned or had yet to be completed,” 
while “in other cases, the project was pursued without taking up the VC’s 
suggestions, or at least the majority of them.”117 Hoffmann-Riem, however, also 
found evidence that other opinions had been fully or partially implemented. There 
can moreover be a temporal element to implementation: recommendations that 
have been ignored by the incumbent government may be taken up by a later 
government.118
Hoffmann-Riem identifies factors that affect compliance, which accord with 
basic intuition in this regard. The most significant factor is whether the state 
requested the opinion, or whether the opinion was thrust on the state through 
request for Commission intervention by an institutional player. Compliance is 
significantly less likely in the latter instance than the former. This is more especially 
so when one adds in the power of the relevant state, and the nature of the opinions 
requested by the institutional intervener. This is exemplified by the five opinions 
concerning Russia produced by the Commission in 2012 at the behest of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Not only was the target state 
very powerful, but the opinions focused on high-profile laws relating to elections to 
the State Duma,119 political parties,120 assembly,121 combating of extremism,122 and 
the Russian Federal Security Service.123 It was scarcely surprising that Russia was 
resistant to change in these areas. The reality was nonetheless that Russia consented, 
after some delay, to site visits for the separate reports, and engaged with the reports 
when they went through the Commission decision-making process, culminating in 
heated exchanges at the plenary session.124
There are, as Hoffmann-Riem notes, other factors that play into compliance. 
Thus, there is the extent to which the Venice Commission opinion draws support 
from other institutional players, such as the Commission of the European Union, 
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where the state that is the subject of the opinion has reason not to offend that other 
institution. A factor that inclines in the other direction is the extent to which the 
state cares about the critique. Where the state remains authoritarian, with little 
appetite for change and little incentive to seek the imprimatur of more liberal states, 
the opinion is likely to fall on stony ground.125
Limits as to the impact of opinions are explicable in part at least by the fact 
that the Commission “can analyse and compare the texts of norms and suggest 
changes, but it has no direct influence on the basic conditions that drive practical 
application of norms in the state concerned.”126This point is important and has 
wider resonance for the limits of transnational impact on national constitutions. 
Lawyers naturally focus, initially at least, on text, and the provenance thereof. We 
ask whether there is evidence that a country’s constitution was shaped by other 
constitutions. We inquire as to causality in this respect. We debate about the relative 
importance of indigenous influence and foreign input. This is an important part of 
the story, but it can only ever be part thereof, for the reason identified by 
Hoffmann-Riem. Thus even where there is formal implementation of Venice 
Commission opinions, substantive implementation will necessarily depend on a 
broad range of societal factors that affect reception of such norms in that state. 
These include, inter alia, the prevailing governmental culture, the bureaucratic 
willingness/capacity to apply the relevant provisions, and the independence of the 
judiciary and access to court. 
Sharing Best Practice and Cooperation 
Assessment of the Commission’s impact should not, however, be confined 
solely to consideration of whether the state implements the opinion addressed to it. 
From its very inception the Venice Commission has operated on a broader front, 
particularly in relation to countries making the transition to more liberal democratic 
regimes. The Commission has always recognised that change will not happen 
overnight, but that it can also be fostered through other activities, including training 
of personnel, seminars, engagement with judges, and conferences. The Venice 
Commission has initiatives across all these areas, and although it is difficult to assess 
their precise impact, it would be misguided to ignore or undervalue such 
initiatives.127 These initiatives are also significant in relation to countries that are not 
formally members of the Commission. The Commission has developed 
programmes with Central Asia, the Southern Mediterranean, and Latin America. 
125. See, e.g., European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Joint
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Thus, in Central Asia,128 the Venice Commission developed projects, some of 
which involved particular countries, others of which were regional, in relation to 
issues such as constitutional assistance, constitutional justice, reform of the 
judiciary, and electoral legislation and practice. The bilateral dimension can be 
exemplified by co-operation, whereby the Commission furnished the newly created 
Constitutional Chamber of Kyrgyzstan with assistance in the field of constitutional 
justice. The Chamber requested such assistance in order to better understand 
international standards and best international practice, since it had no experience in 
the field of constitutional justice hitherto. The regional dimension to such co-
operation is exemplified by the 2009 rule of law initiative, run jointly with the EU, 
which was aimed at the five Central Asian countries Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.129 The objectives of the programme 
were, inter alia, to strengthen the rule of law and separation of powers; enhance the 
independence of the judiciary; assist in reform of the public prosecutorial function; 
facilitate integration of international law into national law; reform electoral law and 
administration; and assist in the training of judges and officials.130
The Venice Commission activities in the Southern Mediterranean region focus 
on provision of assistance and advice to Arab countries even before the Arab 
Spring, with close contacts established with Morocco and Tunisia. This can, as in 
the context of Central Asia, take the form of bilateral exchange, or regional support. 
The former is exemplified by Commission support, following a request from 
Morocco in 2014 for assistance in the preparation of two organic laws concerning 
the High Judicial Council and the Status of Judges. A good example of the regional 
dimension is the University for Democracy (UniDem) Campus for the Southern 
Mediterranean Countries.131 The programme ran from 2015 to 2017, with seminars 
on good governance, the rule of law, and fundamental rights for high-level civil 
servants of the region. 
The theme of sharing best practice and cooperation is also apparent in 
relations between the Commission and countries in Latin America. Some countries 
from this region, such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, are members, and 
Commission initiatives designed to foster best practice in areas such as democratic 
transition, constitution-building, constitutional justice, and electoral legislation have 
been especially prevalent in relation to such countries.132 Such initiatives have been 
fostered by the sub-Commission on Latin America. The sharing of best practice is 
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not, however, confined to states that are members of the Commission. There have 
been further conferences involving in excess of twenty countries from Latin 
America and Europe, which dealt with matters such as individual access to 
constitutional justice, and implementation of human rights treaties at domestic 
level.133 Moreover, in 2013, the first meeting of the Sub-Commission on Latin 
America outside Venice took place in Mexico City in 2013, and was attended by 
states that were not members of the Venice Commission.134
CONCLUSION
There will be no attempt to summarise the entirety of the preceding argument. 
Suffice it to say the following; we should be cautious about extremes, particularly 
where they relate to the evaluation of the trans-national impact of a particular 
institution on national constitution-making broadly conceived. There are dangers of 
over-estimation, imagining a transformative effect that cannot readily be sustained 
on the facts. There are equally dangers of under-estimation, denying that change 
can be causally associated with the work of a particular institution. We should be 
equally mindful of the need for balance when considering the workings, procedural 
and substantive, of any particular institution. It is axiomatic that all institutions are 
imperfect to some degree, and we should therefore be ready to engage in critical 
scrutiny. We should, by the same token, subject critiques to careful evaluation. 
The preceding discussion has sought to explicate and evaluate the work of the 
Venice Commission, and its impact on transnational constitution-making broadly 
conceived. The very fact that there is an institution, which is independent and can 
draw on the legal expertise of highly qualified members in order to proffer advice 
to countries concerning the compatibility of their constitutions and laws with the 
precepts of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, is a force for good. The 
very fact that membership of the Venice Commission encompasses all states that 
are party to the Council of Europe, and some that are not, helps to ensure the 
plurality and respect for cultural difference that is necessary when engaged in the 
provision of such opinions. There will inevitably be instances where there will be 
contestation as to the content of a particular opinion. Thus was it ever so in this 
domain. It should nonetheless also be recognized that transnational contribution to 
national constitutions can take various forms, from aid in the drafting of the 
constitution itself to advice on laws concerning human rights, and from measures 
to safeguard the independence of the judiciary to those designed to secure free and 
fair elections. The very fact that the Venice Commission can operate across this 
range has enhanced its impact. 
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